RESPONSE

SHOULD DISSIMILAR USES OF TRADE SECRETS
BE ACTIONABLE?

CAMILLA A. HRDY†
INTRODUCTION
Joseph Fishman and Deepa Varadarajan address a critical question in their
new article, Similar Secrets1: should trade secret law prohibit substantially
dissimilar uses of trade secret information by those who took that information
through improper means or in violation of a duty of conﬁdentiality to the
information’s owner, particularly when those dissimilar uses result in
innovative new pursuits of high social value? For example, what if an engineer
leaves her old company and uses trade secrets she learned there to start a new
business in a totally diﬀerent industry? Under current doctrine such an action
would likely lead to a viable claim of trade secret misappropriation. But
should this type of “retooling” really be discouraged by trade secret law? This
is the question addressed by the authors. And it is an especially timely one,
since trade secret law has been federalized via the Defend Trade Secrets Act
of 2016 (DTSA).2 Like patents, copyrights, and trademarks, trade secrets are
now the subject of federal civil law, rather than just state law.3
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law; Aﬃliated Fellow, Information
Society Project, Yale Law School. Thanks for insightful comments on this response from Dmitry
Karshtedt, Mark Lemley, and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online.
1 Joseph Fishman & Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (2019).
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2018) (granting federal jurisdiction to civil actions against
misappropriation).
3 See generally Sharon Sandeen & Christopher Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of
Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2017) (describing the potential development of
a “federal common law” of trade secrecy); Camilla A. Hrdy, Sandeen and Seaman: Toward a Federal
Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2016/09/sandeen-and-seaman-toward-federal.html
[https://perma.cc/6ZBC-H454] (suggesting an examination of trademark law for a “plausible
historic precedent within the intellectual property genre for how a novel federal IP regime can
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Fishman and Varadarajan challenge the current approach for determining
misappropriation in trade secret law—which assesses whether a defendant’s
end use is “substantially derived” from the plaintiff ’s trade secrets.4 They argue
the law should instead take into account the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s end
uses for the allegedly infringing information.5 Furthermore, they suggest that
if the defendant’s end use is highly dissimilar from the plaintiff ’s, the law
should not, as a general matter, prohibit it.6 Fishman and Varadarajan derive
their “substantial similarity” limitation on infringement, more or less, from
copyright law’s test for actionable copying and the doctrine of fair use.7
Similar Secrets is well-written and full of useful insights; it is also highly
controversial. This Response shows that the article’s thesis—that trade secret
law should imitate copyright law’s willingness to permit substantially
dissimilar uses of content—conﬂicts with trade secret law’s fundamental
purpose: to protect the integrity of secret information. The Response also
observes that trade secret law already has a doctrine that addresses many of
the harms with which the authors are concerned. It is already black letter law
that employees’ “general knowledge, skill, and experience” cannot be a trade
secret.8 This subject-matter exclusion is intended to permit employees to
learn on the job and then leave to pursue new opportunities.9 Whereas
Fishman and Varadarajan have turned to copyright law for help, it makes
more sense to focus on improving the doctrines we already have. Improving
existing doctrines will do more to ameliorate concerns about hindering
innovative new uses, while maintaining trade secret law’s fundamental goals.

emerge on top of state common law regime”). For a discussion of the federalization of patent law
and intellectual property law, see generally Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally,
31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301 (2016); Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Anti-Patent Law,
89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133 (2018); Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez-Faire,
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45 (2013). Note that the new federal law, the DTSA, does not preempt
state trade secret law. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2018) (“This chapter shall not be construed to preempt
or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by United States Federal, State,
commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the misappropriation of a trade secret . . . .”).
Moreover, aspects of the law explicitly provide that federal remedies cannot interfere with state
remedies. See, e.g., id. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i)(II) (prohibiting an injunction under the DTSA from
“otherwise conﬂict[ing] with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful
profession, trade, or business”).
4 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1053-60.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See Camilla A. Hrdy, The General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Paradox, 60 B.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11 & n.74) (“Courts within virtually every state and federal circuit have
purported to recognize this general rule.”), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3332540
[https://perma.cc/2C5D-LMFM].
9 Id. (manuscript at 33-36).
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I. THE CURRENT “SUBSTANTIALLY DERIVED” STANDARD
Fishman and Varadarajan begin by observing that trade secret law
currently makes “dissimilar” end uses of trade secrets actionable. Thus, under
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, “an actor is liable for using the
trade secret [even] with independently created improvements or
modifications if the result is substantially derived from the trade secret.”10 The
result has effectively been a “but-for” test that asks whether the defendant could
have proceeded as she did without relying on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.11
The example of applying the substantial derivation test that Sharon
Sandeen and Elizabeth Rowe give is a case involving a process for producing
industrial synthetic diamond.12 In General Electric v. Sung,13 a former General
Electric (GE) employee, Chien-Min Sung learned the details of GE’s process
for making synthetic diamond in the course of his job at GE.14 When he left
GE, Sung took “an abundance of documents, including drawings and process
instructions.”15 Sung then contracted with a competitor in the synthetic
diamond industry, Iljin, and agreed to transfer information about the process
to Iljin.16 Iljin used the information to quickly develop its own process for
producing synthetic saw-grade diamond, which involved a similar 5,000-ton
apparatus.17 It had taken GE over twenty years to develop its “comparable”
production process involving a diﬀerent 5,000-ton piece of machinery.18 Iljin
derived its process in only two years, because it acquired GE’s trade secrets
through Sung, an insider who had received this information under an express
or implied duty to maintain its secrecy.19 This type of unfair shortcut is classic
trade secret misappropriation.20
Is this misappropriation actionable even though Iljin did not use GE’s
trade secrets to produce an identical process or an identical machine, or even
identical synthetic diamond? The answer is clearly yes. The standing rule,
10 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1064-65 (alterations in original) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995)).
11 Id. at 1067 (“In some judicial formulations, the use element essentially becomes a but-for
test: if the defendant wouldn’t have thought to pursue a particular research project without having
ﬁrst been exposed to the secret, it has committed misappropriation—regardless of how far aﬁeld
that research leads.”).
12 ELIZABETH ROWE & SHARON SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET
LAW 423-27 (1st ed. 2012).
13 843 F. Supp. 776 (D. Mass. 1994).
14 Id. at 778.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 778-79.
18 Id. at 779.
19 Id. at 780.
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5) (deﬁning misappropriation to include the nonconsensual disclosure
or use of another’s trade secret by an individual who had a duty to maintain its secrecy).
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again, is that “[t]rade secret protection . . . extends not only to the
misappropriated trade secret itself but also to materials ‘substantially derived’
from that trade secret.”21
So far so good. But what if Sung used the drawings and process
instructions—which GE had developed in order to make synthetic diamonds—
to start a bakery, Sung’s Kitchen, where Sung succeeded in developing the best
damn chocolate chip cookies humanity has ever experienced? Sung discovered
that all you have to do is put chocolate chips, butter, flour, and an egg (no baking
powder required) into a 50-pound apparatus derived from GE’s 5,000-ton
version and bake them for thirty seconds. Sung later franchises his bakery into
a global operation that Forbes lists as the most profitable new company of the
year and that provides cheap, delicious homemade cookies to the masses.
Sung’s actions in this second hypothetical still constitute misappropriation, at
least under trade secret law’s current “substantially derived” standard, because
Sung apparently derived his method for making cookies directly from GE’s trade
secret information. The fact that his end use for the information is quite different
does not change the result under current doctrine. But Fishman and Varadarajan’s
article urges us to question whether this outcome is truly normatively desirable.
Surely, as Fishman and Varadarajan suggest, society would be better off if Sung
were permitted to make and sell his delicious cookies. Us cookie eaters would
benefit from Sung’s addition to the store of culinary knowledge. Additionally,
GE’s position in the market for synthetic diamonds would remain intact even if
Sung were to move forward with his bakery business.
II. THE PROPOSED STANDARD: NO LIABILITY FOR UNFORESEEABLE USES
Building on these sorts of arguments about the beneﬁts of cumulative
innovation, Fishman and Varadarajan assert that trade secret law’s current
“substantially derived” standard is too restrictive for defendants like the
ﬁctional Sung, who seek to use trade secrets for activities that are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the secret’s original application and potentially quite
productive.22 As currently applied, the rule “wrongly skips over an inquiry
into the defendant’s ends” and thus creates liability even in the “ubiquitous
scenario where a defendant’s product isn’t exactly like the plaintiﬀ ’s.”23
In Sung’s case, for example, the authors would argue that the law should
not penalize Sung for deploying GE’s trade secrets in order to design a novel
way to make chocolate chip cookies rather than to compete with GE in the
synthetic diamond market. Their solution is to fundamentally alter trade
21
22
23

Sung, 843 F. Supp. at 778-79.
See Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1056-57.
Id.
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secret law’s standard for misappropriation by “consider[ing] not only the
defendant’s beneﬁt from knowing the secret, but also the exploitable asset,
whether a product or a process, that the beneﬁt ultimately translates into.”24
Under their revised approach, the defendant would no longer
be liable for using a lawfully acquired secret unless it is both exploiting an
asset that incorporates material elements from the owner’s secret and is doing
so in a market that the plaintiﬀ actually foresaw or, given industry trends,
could reasonably have foreseen. Merely relying on a secret as a launching pad
for developing a genuinely dissimilar good, or operating in a remote and
unanticipatable market, would remain permissible.25

The upshot is that if a defendant uses a trade secret to develop a “genuinely
dissimilar good” or to develop an application for the trade secret “in a remote
and unanticipatable market,” this would not qualify as actionable use of trade
secrets and would remain permissible. Plaintiffs would be able to control a
defendant’s exploitation of trade secrets in “reasonably foreseeable markets”;
but they would not be able to stop defendants from using the information in
“remote [markets] that could not have been anticipated ex ante.”26
The greatest new hurdle here is that the plaintiﬀ now has to prove the
defendant made a “material and foreseeable use [of plaintiﬀ ’s trade secrets]
as part of [the plaintiﬀ ’s] case-in-chief.”27 For instance, in this case, GE would
have to show that Sung used a quantitatively and qualitatively material aspect
of GE’s trade secrets to make his new process and that GE “actually foresaw”
Sung’s use or alternatively that a “reasonable ﬁrm” in GE’s industry would
have foreseen Sung’s use of making cookies.28 If not, the adaptation would be
permitted, despite the fact that Sung technically used GE’s trade secret
information to make his cookies.29
The authors derive this standard from copyright law or at least argue that
copyright law provides a “proof of concept” for how their standard would
work.30 In copyright law, protection does not cover any use of copyrighted
expression. Rather, a fundamental premise of copyright infringement analysis
Id. at 1057.
Id.
Id. at 1057, 1079. At a more granular level, the authors propose three changes to the current
substantial derivation doctrine: (1) compare the plaintiﬀ ’s and the defendant’s end uses rather than
merely the steps they took along the way; (2) seek a “material” contribution from the trade secret,
rather than simply asking whether the defendant could have acted as she did “but for” the trade
secret; and (3) allow plaintiﬀs to control a defendant’s exploitation of trade secrets in “reasonably
foreseeable markets but not in remote ones that could not have been anticipated ex ante.” Id. at 1079.
27 Id. at 1059.
28 See id. at 1092.
29 See id.
30 Id. at 1059.
24
25
26
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is that “[m]erely copying something from a work isn’t enough.”31 The
defendant must have actually copied (i.e. derived) her work from copyrighted
expression, and the defendant’s end use must be “substantially similar” to
protectable aspects of plaintiff ’s work.32 For example, if a movie copies minor
aspects of someone’s novel in deriving the plot, this is not copyright
infringement if, in the end, the movie is completely different from the novel.33
III. THE CRITIQUE
I agree with Fishman and Varadarajan’s premise that what the defendant
does with trade secrets should matter in deciding liability, and that preventing
totally diﬀerent end uses of information can seem problematic from the
standpoint of innovation policy. However, their proposal to narrow trade
secret misappropriation to cover only suﬃciently similar end uses faces
several challenges. I focus on three here. First, the proposal contradicts trade
secret law’s (versus copyright law’s) goal of preserving the secrecy of
information. Second, it risks undermining trade secret law’s corollary
function of facilitating eﬃcient information sharing, especially between
employers and employees. Third, it ignores the existence of alternative trade
secret doctrines that, in my view, do a better job at mitigating trade secret
law’s chilling eﬀects on competition and innovation. In particular, trade secret
law’s exclusion of “general knowledge, skill, and experience” allows former
employees like Sung to leave their current job and use their improved skills,
training, and experience to pursue new endeavors.34
1. Conﬂict with Trade Secret Law’s Goal to Protect the
Integrity of Secret Information
The authors’ proposal contradicts the basic premise of trade secret law,
which is to protect the integrity of secret information. Ideally, the trade secret
owner will succeed in keeping their secrets internal without relying on
litigation. But when unsanctioned use occurs, for instance by a departing

Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1073-74.
See, e.g., Randolph v. Dimension Films, 630 F. Supp. 2d 741, 746-49 (S.D. Tex. 2009)
(holding that a movie did not infringe a copyrighted novel despite certain similarities because “there
is no substantial similarity in the protectable elements of the works. The basic elements of plot,
themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events—and the overall concept
and feel of both works—are very diﬀerent”).
34 Hrdy, supra note 8 (manuscript at 33-36).
31
32
33
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employee, the trade secret lawsuit itself, and in particular the trade secret
injunction, becomes the mechanism for protecting the secrecy of the information.35
Copyright law is different: the risk of disclosure of secret information is
not the focus. Copyright law protects original expression that has been fixed
in a tangible medium.36 Except in the rarer cases where the author has not yet
published,37 this original, fixed expression has typically already been publicly
disclosed and disseminated. The goal of the copyright owner is generally to
control and profit from further public dissemination. Accordingly, a copyright
defendant’s “substantially similar” expression (reproduction, distribution,
public performance, etc.38) is actionable, but a dissimilar one is not. Copyright
law goes even further, permitting “fair” uses that are otherwise infringing, but
that do not supplant the value of the original work.39
Losses resulting from dissimilar or fair uses of a copyrighted work, such
as lost sales or declining reputation, may be economically costly or
inconvenient for the author. But they do not threaten the fundamental
protections that copyright law aﬀords. For example, if GE publishes a manual
describing a method for making synthetic diamonds and Sung takes minimal
amounts of expression or artfully quotes from the manual in his cookbook,
Sung is not liable for copyright infringement because this is (one hopes) a
dissimilar or at least fair use.
But in the trade secret context, permitting even drastically dissimilar uses
of secret information does threaten the fundamental protections trade secret
law aﬀords. When a defendant’s use results in public disclosure of the trade
secret, this obviously must be actionable, regardless of whether it is the same
or diﬀerent type of use. To channel the Supreme Court,
With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the
very deﬁnition of the property interest. Once the data that constitute a trade
secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, the
holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data.40

To their credit, the authors recognize the risk of secrecy destruction as a
major limitation on their proposal. In their view, “[e]ven groundbreaking
adapters should . . . still be accountable if after the fact they disclose the secret

35 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (2018) (generally permitting court to enjoin “actual or
threatened misappropriation . . . on such terms as the court deems reasonable”).
36 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
37 See generally Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(addressing copyright infringement and fair use with respect to unpublished works).
38 17 U.S.C. § 106.
39 Id. § 107.
40 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984).
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in ways likely to destroy its value . . . .”41 Just as well, “controlling against
exclusivity-destroying disclosures” is necessary because “if the use winds up
spilling the secret, it wipes out the entire value.”42 The authors also would not
condone using “improper means” to acquire trade secrets,43 like trespass,
hacking, or ﬂying a plane over a factory to see a hidden process. This too is
an essential caveat, because one of trade secret law’s three goals—along with
providing incentives to invest in valuable information and to productively
share that information with others in controlled disclosures—is to deter tortlike breaches of duty and other acts that fall below standards of commercial
morality in the industry.44
The authors argue that, with these caveats, their proposal will “channel[]”
putative defendants away from disclosing uses, immoral uses, and predictable
competing uses, and towards unforeseeable uses with “large positive
externalities.”45 So, in Sung’s case, he would not be liable under trade secret
law for using GE’s process in the unforeseeable, noncompeting fashion of
baking cookies, but he would be liable if his use threatened to publicly disclose
the information or was premised on using improper means like spying to
acquire the information. The authors thus echo arguments about reverse
engineering’s productivity and cumulative innovation beneﬁts made by
scholars such as Pam Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer.46
I don’t think this carve-out for “disclosing” uses will work. And if it does
work, it will gut the authors’ proposal. The reason is that it is
virtually impossible to identify uses of trade secrets that do not threaten
disclosure of the original trade secret. Even if the plaintiﬀ uses its trade secret
process to make synthetic diamonds, and the defendant uses a derived but
dramatically tweaked process to make chocolate chip cookies, there is always
a chance the trade secret will inadvertently be disclosed by the defendant’s
use and thereby eliminate the plaintiﬀ ’s market advantage. For example, what
if Sung’s security precautions are poor, and others access the information
through him? Even if Sung’s security is excellent and the chocolate chip
cookies are the only possible public vehicle for revelation of GE’s
Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1108-09.
Id. at 1109.
Id.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) (“Trade secret law will
encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent
innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention. Competition is fostered
and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite patentable, invention.”).
45 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1109.
46 Id.; see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1662 (2002) (“Reverse engineering is fundamentally directed to
discovery and learning . . . . Reverse engineering leads to dependent creations, but this does not
taint them, for in truth, all innovators stand on the shoulders of both giants and midgets.”).
41
42
43
44
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information, third parties might be able to reverse engineer GE’s process
using information contained in the cookies, even if they would not have been
able to reverse engineer the process by studying the original diamonds.
Essentially, a defendant’s use itself might not cause any competitive harm
and might be totally unpredictable, but it can still destroy the trade secret in
the end, because every use of a trade secret that is outside the trade secret
owner’s control creates a new risk. Indeed, this proposal seems to contradict
the requirement that trade secrets owners must take “reasonable measures to
keep [the claimed] information secret.”47 At the least, it changes the standard
for what is reasonable. Whereas before, GE had to craft secrecy precautions
around the possibility of employees departing with trade secrets, now it
would arguably be “unreasonable” to share information with employees at all
because those employees can now use it more liberally. In short, even though
Fishman and Varadarajan’s proposal ostensibly only loosens the
misappropriation standard for certain insiders who use trade secrets
noncompetitively, it eﬀectively increases the risk of trade secret exposure to
third parties and the general public as well.
2. Reduced Willingness to Share with Employees
This leads to my second critique, which is that the proposal substantially
weakens the rights that trade secret owners currently have to protect trade
secrets from their own employees and therefore risks hindering productive
sharing between employers and employees.
A primary purpose of trade secret law, as initially developed in the United
States in the nineteenth century, has been to give employers new freedom to
share trade secrets with employees outside the scope of traditional circles of
loyalty. To quote the now-standard story, “[t]he invention of trade secret
doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century enabled employers to enjoin
revelation of secret information by current or former employees.”48 The
Supreme Court drew this out in Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp. in 1974, writing
that trade secret protection is designed to stand against “breaches of
conﬁdence” in “the employee and licensee situations.”49 This is precisely why
the “necessary element of secrecy is not lost . . . if the holder of the trade
secret reveals [it] to another.”50 “These others may include . . . employees to
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2018).
Catherine Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and
the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 442 (2001). See generally
Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do
Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010) (tracing the development
of trade secret law).
49 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484.
50 Id. at 475.
47
48
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whom it is necessary to confide it, in order to apply it to the uses for which
it is intended.”51 Without trade secret law, the Court reasoned, employers
would have incentives “to hoard rather than disseminate knowledge.”52
Mark Lemley reiterated this argument in an oft-cited 2008 article: “It seems
odd . . . for the law to encourage secrets, or to encourage only those
inventions that are kept secret.”53
If “unforeseeable” uses are suddenly nonactionable, the problem of “tech
hoarding” reemerges with a vengeance. If employers do not feel it is safe to
share trade secrets with employees, they might become overly cautious about
doing so. Under Kewanee’s reasoning, we should expect employers to start to
take costly self-help measures, ranging from physical security measures to
overreliance on nondisclosure contracts, or perhaps even refuse to hire
altogether.54 This would not only lead to ineﬃciency in the workplace,55 but
also reduce the chance that employees ever get access to the starting materials
they need to launch new pursuits.56
Closely related, the proposal would require a reconﬁguration of the
standard for what constitutes a breach of a “duty to maintain the secrecy of
the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret.”57 Since the authors have
taken “improper means” cases oﬀ the table, they are mainly addressing insider
cases, where an employee, a business partner, or a contractor breaches a duty
not to use or disclose the secret. Narrowing actionable uses of trade secrets
to “foreseeable” uses would require rethinking the circumstances in which
Id. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 486.
Mark Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 S TAN. L.
R EV. 311, 313 (2008).
54 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 486 (“Knowledge would be widely dispersed among the employees
of those still active in research. Security precautions necessarily would be increased, and salaries and
fringe beneﬁts of those few oﬃcers or employees who had to know the whole of the secret invention
would be ﬁxed in an amount thought suﬃcient to assure their loyalty.”); see also Michael Risch, Why
Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 41 (2007) (“[T]he ability to protect
against employees absconding with information is diﬃcult and costly . . . .”).
55 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991)
(“The more Rockwell restricts access to its drawings, either by its engineers or by the vendors, the
harder it will be for either group to do the work expected of it.”); Risch, supra note 54, at 41 (“[T]he
owner would have to choose between ineﬃcient ways to keep information from being taken by
employees, suing for the limited remedies available for breach of contract, or paying the employees
more than they could gain by absconding.”).
56 One might respond that trade secret law already exposes employers to the risk of disclosure
because, unlike patent law, it permits learning trade secrets through “reverse engineering”—taking
apart a product to discern its secrets. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6) (2018). But this point is inapposite.
Trade secret law legalizes reverse engineering for the same reason it legalizes obtaining trade secrets
through independent derivation: these acts rely purely on information in the public domain and do
not draw on conﬁdential disclosures. The process of reverse engineering could be deemed tainted,
for example, if the trade secret owner’s former employees are involved.
57 See id. § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(II) (deﬁning “misappropriation”).
51
52
53
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a person is placed under a duty to maintain secrecy. At present, employees
are held to have an implicit, if not explicit, duty to maintain the secrecy of
their employers’ trade secrets and to not use or disclose them for any reason
without authorization. But under the authors’ proposal, this duty would
effectively contain the implicit caveat: “Unforeseeable ones, which the
plaintiff did not and could not reasonably have predicted at the time it
decided to invest in developing the secret, should be permitted.”58
The fact that implementing the foreseeability standard requires
reconfiguring trade secret law’s duty to maintain secrecy, and effectively
rewriting the employment contract, should warrant significant pause.
3. Trade Secret Law Already Permits Employees to Use Their
“General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience”
Creating a new outlet for productive uses of trade secrets that do not risk
disclosure or cause market harm is a laudable goal. But trade secret law
already has an equitable doctrine to address the authors’ concerns: the
doctrine that employees remain free to use their “general knowledge, skill,
and experience,” notwithstanding the restrictions of trade secret law.59 This
preserves a much larger swath of productive activity, without introducing an
entirely new risk of information disclosure into the law.
Fishman and Varadarajan appear to assume trade secret law currently
prevents employees from pursuing the work of their choosing upon
departure. “A popular refrain in misappropriation cases,” they write, “is that
courts ‘cannot compel a man who changes employers to wipe clean the slate
of his memory.’”60 “But often it seems like they’re trying to.”61 Relatedly, the
authors assert that injunctions are often granted as a matter of course.62 But
this isn’t quite true. As I explain in my article The General Knowledge, Skill,
and Experience Paradox, it is already black letter law that “general knowledge,
skill, and experience” cannot be a trade secret.63 This doctrine was designed
58 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1058. To get around this problem, the authors suggest
that their proposal can be inserted into the statutory definition of “use.” Id. at 1107-08. But in practice,
the proposal would necessarily alter what it means for a recipient of certain information to have a
duty to maintain secrecy. A recipient who uses trade secrets in ways that are foreseeable to the trade
secret owner would be in breach of a duty but not, generally speaking, otherwise.
59 See generally Hrdy, supra note 8 (examining the development and modern misapplication of
the “general knowledge, skill, and experience” doctrine).
60 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1078 (quoting Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 23
Cal. Rptr. 198, 210 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962)).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1112 (noting that “a number of courts continue to presume that trade secret
misappropriation produces irreparable harm and that successful plaintiﬀs are therefore entitled to
an injunction,” and “other courts treat perpetual injunctions as the default”).
63 Hrdy, supra note 8 (manuscript at 11 & n.74).
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precisely to ensure that former employees can leave and pursue new work,
even after learning their employer’s trade secrets.64 Courts will often use this
doctrine to limit the scope of trade secret subject matter65 or at least narrow
injunctions against employees to shield their ability to continue working in
the field.66 Courts continue to apply this doctrine today.67
4. Are Analogies Between Trade Secret Law and Copyright Useful?
Lastly, I question more generally whether analogies between copyright
law and trade secret law are useful. I think this article is an example of where
this cross-IP approach is interesting, fascinating, and educational. But I am
not sure making analogies to copyright law is where we want to be in the end.
Copyright law is fundamentally about encouraging creative expressions of
ideas and the disclosure and dissemination of those ideas while using a
plethora of doctrines to preserve the creator’s productive uses of preexisting
materials. However, trade secret law is fundamentally about addressing
breaches of duty and making it feasible to preserve the secrecy of valuable
information while also engaging in productive sharing of that information.
Just because copyright law tolerates dissimilar uses does not inevitably
suggest that trade secret law should try to replicate this approach.68 Moreover,
Id. (manuscript at 33-36).
See, e.g., Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 143-44 (9th
Cir. 1965) (holding that the alleged trade secret was actually a general approach to manufacturing
tape recorders); Van Prods. Co. v. Gen. Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 777 (Pa. 1965)
(reasoning that the alleged trade secret was generalized knowledge relating to “the ﬁeld of
deliquescent dessicant [sic] air driers”).
66 See, e.g., SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1262-66 (3d Cir. 1985); T-N-T
Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 24-26 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
67 A recent Judge Rakoff case illustrates just how far this doctrine can extend to deny trade
secret protection against departing employees. See In re Document Techs. Litig., 275 F. Supp. 3d 454,
465 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“The Individual Defendants’ general knowledge of the revenue attributable to
each client is further not protectable, since labeling this kind of knowledge as proprietary would
prevent former employees from ever pursuing clients or customers whom they believe generate
substantial business for their former employers.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
68 In his paper The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, Mark Lemley reaches a similar conclusion,
suggesting that it may be appropriate to extend liability to dissimilar uses of trade secret
information, even if this approach does not make sense in other IP regimes like copyright. Mark
Lemley, Essay, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree in IP Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 245, 267 (2017). Professor
Lemley maintains that “it makes sense for trade secret law, but not other IP regimes, to adopt the
fruit of the poisonous tree rule [which creates liability for uses that are tainted with the right owner’s
information] as a default.” Id.; see also id. at 250 (“[I]f trade secret law were not ﬂexible enough to
encompass modiﬁed or even new products that are substantially derived from the trade secret of
another, the protections that law provides would be hollow indeed.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. Nat’l Chem. Co., 87 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir. 1996))). That said,
Professor Lemley also endorses Professor Varadarajan’s argument, which she made in a previous
article, that trade secret law should have a “fair use” outlet similar to copyright law. Id. at 269 n.110
(referencing Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 F ORDHAM L. R EV . 1401 (2014)).
64
65
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trade secret law already has its own set of doctrines, including the “general
knowledge, skill, and experience” exclusion, which limit the scope of claimed
subject matter and cabin the scenarios that are actionable. One solution
would be to focus on improving these existing doctrines and correcting the
existing foibles in courts’ understandings and applications, rather than
drawing on an external IP regime.
This suggestion does not need to end at copyright law, either. To the
extent we feel the need to draw on similar concepts like copyright law, we
could also appeal to broader principles that stem from outside of IP law, such
as tort law and contract law—both of which appear to have quite a lot in
common with trade secret law.69 We could even stay inside the trade-secretlaw sphere in order to get to the same place.70
CONCLUSION
Disagreements aside, I absolutely love this article. By identifying
doctrines in this crucial and evolving area of intellectual property law that
may need to be revisited and reconﬁgured, Fishman and Varadarajan have
certainly moved the discussion of trade secret law forward. I also suspect that
we will begin to see more of this type of scholarship—that is, comparative
proposals that analyze trade secret doctrine alongside more established
federal IP regimes. I see this as a welcome development, but also one that
requires close attention. We have to recognize that there are limitations in
importing concepts from one IP ﬁeld into another.
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In contrast, the arguments in this Response would generally weigh against a “trade secret fair use”
outlet as well.
69 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1093 (“[A] foreseeability limitation has an excellent
pedigree. From tort law’s proximate causation to contract law’s doctrine of impossibility, courts have
tried to cabin liability when an intervening event genuinely cannot be anticipated.”).
70 For instance, as the authors note, plaintiﬀs in many trade secret cases already have to prove
proximate causation, at least with respect to damages. See In re TXCO Res., Inc., 475 B.R. 781, 82223 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2012) (“In order to recover actual damages, TXCO was ﬁrst required to show
that Peregrine’s use of TXCO’s trade secrets proximately caused TXCO to suﬀer a speciﬁc injury.
Proximate cause consists of two elements: (1) foreseeability, and (2) cause in fact.”).

